From the Guest editors alexander m. Wyglinski, James Irvine, and Joseph chapman ehicles, and the transportation systems within which they operate, are becoming increasingly smart with more sophisticated sensing and control functionality. Most of these enhancements are designed to improve the safety of these systems as well as the support of both semi-and fully autonomous operations, such as driverless cars in the case of automotive applications. Consequently, we are beginning to realize a highly integrated network of numerous electronic control units (ECUs) onboard these various transportation platforms that perform a wide range of tasks in unison. The controller area network (CAN) is one of the more common communication technologies employed for this purpose. Different applications possess different protocols for enabling the communications of ECUs across the CAN bus, although the concept is approximately the same with respect to how information is shared in real time between devices to perform various operations.
Access to the CAN bus network was initially designed to only have a couple interfaces, thus limiting access to the network. Although this framework has helped protect the CAN bus and the ECUs connected to it during the past several decades, we have recently begun to witness several serious and well-publicized/published security breaches of CAN networks employing relatively low-cost methods, such as off-the-shelf embedded computing devices and open-source software. These exploits transformed various elements connected to the CAN bus and leveraged them as new attack surfaces, such as obtaining unauthorized access via the Bluetooth connection in a car's stereo system, feeding false information into a transportation platform's array of environmental sensors, or accessing the CAN bus via the wireless tire-pressure-monitoring system used on a growing number of automotive platforms. With the advent of the connected vehicle, issues with security and privacy are expected to worsen unless new research, techniques, and tools are designed to help the vehicular technology community combat these significant threats.
This special issue of IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine presents the latest findings and perspectives on the emerging and important area of vehicular security and privacy. Five articles form this special issue, all of which introduce a breadth of new solutions that will help the community combat the growing threat of vehicular cyberattacks. These solutions include cryptographic methods, blockchain, and new architectural considerations for CAN to protect these transportation systems both from a wireless perspective as well as from inside the vehicle itself.
Many of the growing number of threats against vehicular systems originate outside the system, leveraging some form of wireless interface to gain access to the system or compromise the way in which the system utilizes wireless information. The first article of this special issue, "Secure Blockchains for Dynamic Spectrum Access," by Khashayar Kotobi and Sven G. Bilén, addresses the threat resulting from wireless connectivity and the motivation for new approaches for vehicular wireless security. Specifically, this article proposes a new approach for securing vehicular communications when spectrum sharing is performed. Applying the concept of blockchain to a vehicular spectrum-sharing architecture, the authors show a significant improvement in terms of spectrum access relative to conventional Aloha medium-access control.
Cryptography is used in security solutions to protect a system or a communications signal from being compromised. The second article of this special issue, "Security Solutions for the Controller Area Network," by Bogdan Groza and Pal-Stefan Murvay, explores the various cryptographic methods that are suitable for CAN networks. In many applications involving CAN networks, almost all communications performed between the ECUs attached to the bus are not encrypted, making them readily susceptible to attack once an adversary gains access to the CAN bus. The authors present an overview of several studies on employing encryption to protect the Another sector affected by cybersecurity threats and privacy issues is the rail industry. In the third article, "Cybersecurity-the Forgotten Issue in Railways," by Leonardo J. Valdivia, Iñigo Adin, Saioa Arrizabalaga, Javier Añorga, and Jaizki Mendizabal, the authors present a detailed overview of the railway environment and identify potential cybersecurity threats against it. In addition to describing the various forms of cyberattacks that a railway environment could experience, the authors go into detail about how these threats can be employed against safety-critical systems and operations. Finally, the authors describe how safety and security are incorporated into the rail standards to ensure that these systems are protected from cyberattacks.
Automotive vehicles, such as cars, trucks, and buses, commonly contain tens of networked ECUs. There have been several papers in the literature detailing how these networks of ECUs onboard a single vehicle can be compromised unless measures are taken to identify potential cyberattacks and to mitigate them. In the fourth article of this special issue, "Securing the Connected Car" by Kim Strandberg, Tomas Olovsson, and Erland Jonsson, a methodology is proposed that will help automobile manufacturers build security into their vehicles before they reach the road. Specifically, the authors propose a methodology called start-predict-mitigate-test (SPMT), which is designed to both predict and mitigate vulnerabilities in vehicles via a systematic security analysis approach adapted specifically for vehicles. The authors provide extensive details about the SPMT approach and how it can be employed throughout the entire life cycle of the vehicle.
Over-the-air firmware updates, enabled by embedded cellular technology, offer advantages to automotive manufacturers by improving the customer experience while reducing costs through automation. However, to maintain safety in an increasingly hostile and unpredictable environment, manufacturers must consider the possibility of compromise and implement cyberresilient designs. In the last article, "Uptane," by Trishank Karthik Kuppusamy, Lois Anne DeLong, and Justin Cappos, the authors present an approach for performing software updates for vehicles in a secure manner. Their proposed approach, referred to as Uptane, presents a practical firmware-update system, and this article goes into detail about how such an approach would be implemented to achieve a relatively high level of security.
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